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Abstract
The correlation between wage premia and concentrations of firm activity may
arise due to agglomeration economies or workers sorting by unobserved produc-
tivity. A worker’s residential location is used as a proxy for their unobservable
productivity attributes in order to test whether estimated work location wage pre-
mia are robust to the inclusion of these controls. Further, in a locational equilib-
rium, identical workers must receive equivalent compensation so that after con-
trolling for residential location (housing prices) and commutes workers must be
paid the same wages and only wage premia arising from unobserved productivity
differences should remain unexplained. The models in this paper are estimated
using a sample of male workers residing in 33 large metropolitan areas drawn
from the 52000 U.S. Decennial Census. We find that wages are higher when
an individual works in a location that has more workers or a greater density of
workers. These agglomeration effects are robust to the inclusion of residential
location controls and disappear with the inclusion of commute time suggesting
that the effects are not caused by unobserved differences in worker productiv-
ity. Extended model specifications suggest that wages increase with the education
level of nearby workers and the concentration of workers in an individual’s own
industry or occupation.
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Wage Premia in Employment Clusters:  Agglomeration Economies or Worker 
Heterogeneity? 
Shihe Fu, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China 
Stephen L. Ross, University of Connecticut 
 
Cities are the primary location of economic activity throughout the world. A key 
explanation for the existence of cities is that the concentration of economic activity enhances the 
efficiency of economic production, in other words agglomeration economies. A long literature 
exists on testing for the existence and uncovering the magnitude and nature of agglomeration 
economies. These studies use a wide variety of approaches including examining productivity  
(Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Henderson, 2003), employment (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and 
Shleifer, 1992; Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner, 1995), establishment births and relocations 
(Carlton, 1983; Duranton and Puga, 2001; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003), co-agglomeration of 
industries ( Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser, 2002), product innovation 
(Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Feldman and Audretsch, 1999), and land rents (Rauch, 1993; 
Dekle and Eaton, 1999).1 
Another increasingly common approach for studying agglomeration is to study wages. A 
central feature of almost every model of agglomeration economies is that agglomeration raises 
productivity. Since workers are paid the value of their marginal production in competitive labor 
markets, a natural test for agglomeration economies is whether workers receive a wage premium 
in areas with concentrated economic activity. Glaeser and Mare (2001), Wheeler (2001), 
Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2004), Fu (2007), Rosenthal and Strange (2006), Yankow 
(2006) and DiAddario and Potacchini (2005) all find that wages are higher in large labor markets 
                                                 
1 See Audretsch and Feldman (2004), Duranton and Puga (2004), Moretti (2004), and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) 
for detailed discussions of the literature on agglomeration economies and production externalities within cities. 
with high concentrations of employment. Other studies, Wheaton and Lewis (2002), Combes, 
Duranton, and Gobillon (2004), and Fu (2007), find evidence that wages increase with 
concentrations of employment in an individual’s own occupation or industry. Many of these 
studies also find a positive link between wages and the human capital level associated with an 
employment concentration.   
A classic question in this literature is whether the concentration of employment causes 
higher productivity and therefore higher wages or whether high quality workers have simply 
sorted into areas with higher concentrations of employment. Glaeser and Mare (2001), Wheeler 
(2001), Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2004) and Yankow (2006) find evidence of an urban 
wage premium using longitudinal data where they can control for heterogeneity using worker 
fixed effects (although worker fixed effects do explain a substantial portion of the raw 
correlation between employment concentration and wages). These studies typically find evidence 
that wages grow faster in larger urban areas, potentially due to faster accumulation of human 
capital. The most compelling evidence behind the human capital accumulation story is provided 
by Glaeser and Mare (2001) who find that workers who migrate away from large metropolitan 
areas retain their earnings gains. The obvious limitation of this approach is that the effect of 
agglomeration on wages is identified by the subset of people who move from one metropolitan 
or labor market area to another.2 
Alternatively, Rosenthal and Strange (2006) address concerns about the endogeneity of 
location by looking within metropolitan areas, rather than across metropolitan areas, and 
                                                 
2 In a cross-sectional study, DiAddario and Potacchini (2005) argue that they have identified causal effects of 
agglomeration on wages because there is almost no migration, i.e. sorting, across the labor markets covered in their 
sample of workers in Italy.  While the paper appears to provide strong evidence that workers in large labor markets 
in Italy are more productive, it is unclear whether this higher productivity arises from agglomeration economies or 
other unobservables, such as across market differences in the quality of the education system or attitudes towards 
work. 
 
controlling for a host of fixed effects. While it may seem counter-intuitive to look within 
metropolitan areas because workplace sorting within a metropolitan area is more obviously 
endogenous than sorting across, Rosenthal and Strange (2006) exploit the additional variation 
arising from these comparisons to control for a variety of fixed effects that cannot be explicitly 
controlled for in studies that exploit across metropolitan variation. Most significantly, they 
include fixed effects for all metropolitan area-occupation combinations. Further, in examining 
the attenuation of agglomeration economies over space,3 they implicitly control for a work 
location fixed effects within metropolitan area by differencing employment concentration effects 
between rings that are different distances from the center of each concentration.4   
Our paper proposes a new strategy that avoids relying on mover’s by drawing explicitly 
on the theoretical implications of standard models in urban economics. A worker’s residential 
location is used as a proxy for their unobservable productivity attributes, and the paper examines 
whether the estimates of work location wage premia are robust to the inclusion of controls for 
residential location. This research design draws on the commonly accepted premise that 
individuals sort over residential location based on tastes, which are partially unobservable and 
correlated with worker productivity. For example, a worker with high productivity knows that 
they can expect a higher lifetime income, and therefore the worker is likely to have a greater 
willingness to pay for neighborhood amenities. Workers residing in similar quality locations 
                                                 
3 Other studies that examine attenuation of agglomeration economies include Henderson and Arzaghi’s (2005) study 
of the advertising industry, Duranton and Overman’s (2002) study of industry localization, Fu’s (In Press) study of 
wages, Rosenthal and Strange’s (2003) study of establishment births, and Sivitanidou’s (1997) study of commercial 
rents. 
4 Rosenthal and Strange (2005) also instrument for the level of agglomeration in a location using geographical 
features of the land on which the employment activity is located.  This IV strategy seems less relevant than the use 
of fixed effects to addressing concerns about worker sorting across employment locations.  The use of such 
instruments should break the correlation between observed employment concentration and unobserved features of 
the location, such as physical access, that may raise profits and lead to a concentration of employment, but does not 
necessarily break the correlation between location and worker unobservables since workers who sort into dense 
employment concentrations will necessarily live in areas where the geography supports such concentrations.  See 
Bayer and Ross (2006) for discussion of a model with place and individual unobservables. 
should have similar levels of productivity, and after controlling for residential location those 
workers should earn similar wages unless their respective employment locations create 
productivity differences between the employees.   
Further, urban economic theory suggests that in a locational equilibrium equivalent 
workers should obtain the same level of utility. After controlling for commuting time 
differences, workers should be indifferent between jobs in different locations even if one of those 
locations creates agglomeration economies leading to higher productivity and higher wages. 
Rational workers will sort into locations with higher wages until either production diseconomies 
lower marginal productivity and wages or congestion raises commuting times and costs. In 
equilibrium, wage differences across locations must be entirely compensated for by more time 
consuming commutes, and unexplained location wage premia should not persist in models that 
control for both residential location and commute time unless that evidence was created by 
unobserved productivity differences between workers.           
 The approach pursued in this paper can be viewed as a complement to the longitudinal 
studies of agglomeration economies discussed above. The longitudinal studies usually focus on 
small research oriented panels of a few thousand workers and are only identified by workers that 
migrate between labor markets. In this paper, we apply our approach to a large cross-sectional 
database, microdata from the U.S. Census, and estimate the effect of concentrated employment 
using a broad population of workers residing in large and mid-sized U.S. metropolitan areas. In 
order to implement our identification strategy, we focus on employment concentrations within 
metropolitan areas. As with Rosenthal and Strange (2006), the focus on within metropolitan 
variation allows us to difference away variation that is likely correlated with both individual 
unobservables and employment location, except that our specific tests of agglomeration 
economies are motivated explicitly by commonly accepted principles concerning how urban 
economies operate. 
We draw a sample of individuals residing in mid-sized to large metropolitan areas from 
the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census and estimate the 
relationship between the concentration of employment in their workplace Public Use Microdata 
Area (PUMA) and their wage rate controlling for a standard set of individual level controls 
including occupation, industry, and metropolitan area fixed effects. We find agglomeration 
effects that are comparable in size to the effects identified by Rosenthal and Strange (2006) using 
a similar sample also drawn from the 2000 PUMS, as well as evidence that the wages are higher 
in locations with more educated workers, again similar to Rosenthal and Strange (2006).5 We 
find that these estimated effects persist even after controlling for unobserved worker productivity 
differences using residential location fixed effects. Further, the inclusion of a commute time 
control eliminates any relationship between the agglomeration variable and wages, suggesting 
that the earlier estimates detected the effect of agglomeration variables rather than unobserved 
differences in worker productivity.   
The two obvious weaknesses of this approach are that residential location at the level 
measured may provide a poor control for unobserved worker quality and that commute time may 
be correlated with the same worker unobservables that potentially bias estimates of 
agglomeration economies.6 In terms of concerns about imperfect neighborhood controls, the 
findings are robust to models that restrict our sample to large metropolitan areas where 
                                                 
5 The influence of the presence of educated workers on wages is discussed in the context of human capital 
externalities.  However, this paper does not make any explicit attempt to test the various competing hypotheses 
concerning the underlying causes of agglomeration economies.  See Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2007) for recent 
work on this question. 
6 The systematic selection of workers across commutes based on income or wage rate is well established in urban 
economics, see LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) and Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (2000).   
residential PUMA’s provide better controls for neighborhood and models that expand controls to 
allow for heterogeneity based on when individuals moved into a neighborhood (Ortalo-Mange 
and Rady, 2006). We address concerns about commute time by estimating models across region, 
worker education, transportation mode, and race/ethnicity. If the influence of commute time 
arises due to correlation with unobservables, we would expect very unstable estimates on the 
commute time variables across these various samples, but the estimated coefficients are quite 
robust across samples suggesting that the estimates capture a fundamental relationship in urban 
economies. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical basis for our 
empirical methodology. The third section describes the data and results, and the fourth section 
concludes. 
Methodology 
The basic empirical model considered is quite similar to models investigated in previous 
wage studies of agglomeration economies. The logarithm of individual i’s wage (yij) in location j 
is  
 ijijiij ZXy εαγβ +++=         (1) 
where Xi a function of individual observable attributes, Zj is employment concentration in the 
employment location (Zj), αi is an individual specific random effect that captures heterogeneity 
in labor market productivity, but is uncorrelated with Xi, and εij is a random error. If individuals 
sort over employment locations based on their expected wage, permanent income or tastes that 
are correlated with productivity, the unobserved component of productivity will be correlated 
with Zj or 
 0],[ ≠jjZE α  
biasing estimates of γ.   
Our proposed solution to this problem arises from simple models of residential location 
sorting based on unobservables (Epple and Platt, 1998; Epple and Sieg, 1999; Bayer and Ross, 
2006). Specifically, these models imply perfect stratification so that if individuals sort across 
residential locations based solely on a common measure of location quality (Wk) and their labor 
market expectations then each residential location k will contain workers in a continuous interval 
of labor market expectations.  Accordingly, worker productivity will be monotonic in location 
quality, or in other words locations can be ordered so that if 
 1+< kk WW   
for location k then 
1+<+< kiik X φαβφ  
for all individuals i residing in location k where φk is assumed to be less than φk+1 for any k.  If 
there are a large number of residential choices then  
 iik X αβφ +≈           (2) 
and consistent estimates of γ can be obtained by substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and 
estimating the following equation. 
 ijjkijk Zy εγδ ++=          (3) 
where δk is the fixed effect for residential location k. 
 However, the use of residential location controls will not produce consistent estimates if 
the number of residential neighborhoods in each metropolitan area is limited, if the sample only 
allocates households to a small number of broad, spatial regions, or if sorting is imperfect. 
Further, sorting will be imperfect if household preferences for location quality differ from the 
household members’ labor market productivity or if households differ in the definition of 
location quality. Naturally, all of these situations are likely to arise in practice, and the empirical 
model must be extended to account for an imperfect correlation between φk and βXi+αi. 
 If φk differs from the productivity of an individual residing in k by a random error (µik) 
that is uncorrelated with βXi+αi or 
 ikiik X µαβφ ++=          (4) 
then a classic measurement error bias arises. Specifically, µik is part of the fixed effect, and since 
it is not part of the model in equation (1) it becomes imbedded in the error term in equation (3). 
This problem is easily observed by substituting equation (4) into equation (1), which yields 
)( ikijjkijk Zy µεγδ −++=         (5) 
The estimated values of δk are attenuated towards zero due to the negative correlation between 
the fixed effect and the unobservable.   
This creates a standard bias in γ where the downward bias in the estimated fixed effects 
causes a bias in γ as well because βXi+αi and therefore the fixed effects δk are correlated with Zj 
due to workers sorting across employment locations. Since the attenuated fixed effect estimates 
provide only a partial control for βXi+αi, the estimates can be improved by directly including Xi 
in the location fixed effect model specification.  
)~~(~~ ikijjkiijk ZXy µεγδβ −+++=        (6) 
where tilde’s have been added to signify the specification change. 
Based on equation (4), the inclusion of βXi+αi into the model would perfectly control for 
µik (and in fact would also eliminate any need for location fixed effects) while the inclusion of Xi 
provides only a partial control. The reader should note that the omission of αi from the model 
along with the inclusion of the residential location fixed effects in equation (6) is likely to lead to 
substantial bias in the estimate of β. Two individuals with different Xi’s residing in the same 
neighborhood or community are likely to have different α’s; otherwise, they would have had 
different preferences and chosen different neighborhoods. This selection process into 
neighborhoods creates a negative correlation between Xi and αi within any residential location 
(Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1999; Bayer and Ross, 2006). This bias, however, is an advantage, rather 
than a problem, for obtaining consistent estimates of γ. The estimates of β adjust to optimally 
absorb variation in αi biasing β, but by absorbing more of the variation in αi the bias in β further 
mitigates bias in the estimates of agglomeration economies from unobserved productivity 
attributes.   
 Our second strategy for testing whether the estimated value of γ is biased by unobserved 
differences in worker productivity draws upon the concept of a locational equilibrium. A 
locational equilibrium requires that no worker desires to change either their residential or 
employment location. Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Ogawa and Fujita (1980) consider a model 
of the urban economy with production externalities and commuting. In these models, they 
specify an equilibrium condition that requires that wages net of commuting costs must be the 
same across all employment locations j conditional on a worker’s residential location. 
Specifically, 
 Wj-t Vjk = Wj’-t Vj’k 
over all work locations j and j’ where Vjk is the commuting time or distance and t is the per mile 
or minute commuting costs.7   
                                                 
7 They refer to their model as non-monocentric because employment concentrations arise endogenously.  See Ross 
(1996) and Ross and Yinger (1995) for examples of the same locational equilibrium condition in a monocentric 
urban model. 
Gabriel and Rosenthal (1996) and Petitte and Ross (1999) applied similar logic to 
empirically study the welfare impacts of residential segregation by testing whether African-
Americans had longer commutes after including residential location, and in the case of Petitte 
and Ross (1999) also including employment location, as controls for housing price and wage 
differentials that might compensate for longer commutes. In our case, we turn this logic on its 
head and control for commute times and residential location fixed effects in our model of wages.   
ijjkjkiij ZVXy εγδηβ )))) ++++=        (6) 
After including a control for commuting time in equation (5), the locational equilibrium 
condition implies that the true estimate of γ)  should be zero if the urban economy is in a 
locational equilibrium.   
However, unobserved differences in worker productivity that are correlated with Zj and 
have not been captured by the residential location fixed effects would still remain in ijε) . If 
estimates of agglomeration economies arose due to unobserved productivity differences, those 
differences should not be compensated for by commute time differences, and the estimated 
relationship between the agglomeration variable and wages should remain after including a 
control for commute time. On the other hand, if the estimated value of γ based on equation (6) is 
near zero, the inclusion of residential location fixed effects must have eliminated any correlation 
between Zj and the unobservable, and accordingly the estimates of agglomeration economies in 
equation (5) are unlikely to contain bias arising from omitted productivity attributes. 
Sample and Data 
The models in this paper are estimated using the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS) from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The sample provides substantially more 
geographic detail on work location than the PUMS from previous censuses. A subsample of 
prime-age (30-59 years of age) full time (usual hours worked per week 35 or greater) male 
workers is drawn for the 33 Consolidated Metropolitan and Metropolitan Statistical areas that 
have one million or more residents and at least three workplace Public Use Microdata Areas 
(PUMA’s).8 These restrictions lead to a sample of 831,046 workers. 
The dependent variable, logarithm of wage rate, is based on a wage that is calculated by 
dividing an individual’s 1999 labor market earnings by the product of number of weeks worked 
in 1999 and usual number of hours worked per week in 1999. The wage rate model includes a 
standard set of labor market controls including variables capturing age, race/ethnicity, 
educational attainment, marital status, number of children in household, immigration status, as 
well as industry, occupation,9 and metropolitan area fixed effects. Finally, the model includes 
controls for share of college-educated employee’s in a worker’s industry or occupation at the 
metropolitan level.10 The mean and standard errors for these variables are shown in Table 1 
separately for the college educated and non-college educated subsamples.  
We consider two alternative specifications to capture employment concentration: the   
number of workers employed at the PUMA and the PUMA employment density.11 The control 
for commute time is based on the average commute time for all full time workers employed at a 
                                                 
8 This sample is comparable to the sample of Rosenthal and Strange (2006) except that we explicitly restrict 
ourselves to considering residents of mid-sized and large metropolitan areas, where the workers employment 
location can be identified below the metropolitan area level. Rosenthal and Strange (2006) also consider smaller 
samples where more precise information on employment location within the metropolitan area is available, and their 
results are robust in those subsamples. 
9 Workers are classified into 20 major occupation codes and 15 major industry codes. 
10 These controls are similar in spirit to a control used by Glaeser and Mare (2001) for occupation education levels 
nationally. Obviously, the industry, occupation, and metropolitan area fixed effects even when combined with the 
metropolitan area industry and occupation education controls do not absorb as much variation as the MSA-
occupation cell fixed effects used by Rosenthal and Strange (2006). Given our focus on models that control for the 
large number of residential PUMA fixed effects, it is not feasible to simultaneously include this large array of MSA-
occupation fixed effects. However, the models without residential fixed effects have been re-estimated with MSA-
occupation fixed effects and results are similar.  Further, models including MSA-occupation fixed effects were 
estimated for some subsamples based on a small number of very large MSA’s, where residential fixed effects could 
be included directly in the model rather than first differenced.  Again, results were similar. 
11 The agglomeration variables are constructed using all full time workers not just the prime-age, male workers as in 
the regression sample. 
workplace PUMA.12 Additional specifications are estimated that control for the fraction of 
workers in the workplace PUMA who have a college degree, are in the same occupation as the 
worker, and are in the same industry as the worker. All standard errors are clustered by 
workplace PUMA. 
Results  
Table 2 presents the results for a baseline model of agglomeration economies in wages 
using both controls for total employment and employment density. The estimates on the control 
variables are quite standard and stable across the two specifications considered. Adding 1000 
workers to a one square mile area would raise wages by 0.62 percent while Rosenthal and 
Strange (2006) find that adding 1,000 college educated workers to within a 5 mile radius of a 
worker’s location increases wages by 0.02 percent, which inflates to about 1.5 percent if the 
number of college educated workers increases by 1000 per square mile in a 5 mile radius.13 The 
model also identifies evidence of human capital externalities by industry and occupation at the 
metropolitan level, but these variables are included as controls and our analysis cannot shed any 
light on whether these estimated relationships are causal.      
                                                 
12 Since the models are identified based on within residential PUMA variation, the workplace PUMA commute time 
implicitly controls for commute times between PUMA of residence and PUMA of work without the measurement 
error inherent in estimating average commute times between every PUMA to PUMA commute combination. 
13 Unlike our model, Rosenthal and Strange (2006) control separately for the number of college educated and non-
college educated workers. They find that the number of college educated workers increases wages while the number 
of non-college educated workers reduces wages. While this result is fairly robust, the number of college and non-
college workers in a workplace PUMA have correlations above 0.97 even after conditioning on metropolitan area or 
residential PUMA. Further, we have identified at least one specification where we observe a sign reversal so that 
wages fall with the number of college educated. Therefore, we include share of college educated workers in a later 
specification. When we estimate models that are directly comparable to Rosenthal and Strange (2006), the estimated 
effect sizes are similar in magnitude. Using the total employment model to illustrate the magnitude of the effect, the 
replacement of 1,000 non-college educated workers with college educated workers increases wages by 0.14 percent.  
In comparison, Rosenthal and Strange (2006) find a 0.12 percent increase in wages if 1,000 non-college educated 
workers were replaced with college educated workers within a 5 mile radius of a worker’s location. Simply adding 
1,000 college educated workers, to a PUMA or 5 mile radius area respectively, increases wages by 0.05 percent in 
our paper and by 0.02 percent in Rosenthal and Strange (2006). 
 
Table 3 contains the estimates for the models that include residential location fixed 
effects and both residential fixed effects and commute time. In the residential location fixed 
effect model, the positive relationship between agglomeration and wages is robust to the 
inclusion of these controls, which should increase the similarity of individuals over which the 
effect of agglomeration economies is identified. In fact, the agglomeration effect appears to 
increase in magnitude from 0.0049 to 0.0081 for the total employment model. These findings are 
consistent with low ability workers sorting into dense concentrations of employment, potentially 
because their residential locations are near these concentrations of employment. While workers 
may sort across employment location based on productivity, this type of sorting is quite likely 
dominated by the fact that workers sort into work locations that are near to where they live. Low 
skill workers are more likely to live in central cities, and therefore more likely to reside close to 
major employment concentrations 
Further, we examine the estimates on the education variables in the wage equations. As 
discussed earlier, if the residential location fixed effects provide effective controls for individual 
productivity unobservables due to residential sorting, the coefficients estimates on human capital 
should be biased towards zero by the inclusion of residential location fixed effects. We find such 
evidence of attenuation bias for both models. In the total employment model, the inclusion of 
residential fixed effects reduces the estimates on greater than masters, masters degree, four year 
college degree, associates degree, and high school diploma from 0.703, 0.577, 0.455, 0.271, and 
0.206 to 0.635, 0.520, 0.408, 0.240, and 0.183, respectively, a reduction of about 10 percent in 
all coefficients.14   
The next column contains the estimates for the model containing residential location 
fixed effects and workplace PUMA average commute time. The coefficient estimate on commute 
                                                 
14 Estimates for the employment density model are virtually identical. 
time is statistically significant and positive. After controlling for residential location, workers 
with the longest commutes also earn the highest wages, which is required if urban economies are 
in a locational equilibrium. Specifically, a one minute increase in one way commute time leads 
to approximately 0.9 percent increase in wages.15 This estimated relationship may seem large, 
but with a seven hour or 420 minute work day excluding lunch a two minute increase in round 
trip commutes represents 0.5 percent increase in the length of the workday. The 0.9 percent point 
estimate is then consistent with the wage valued time impact of a longer commute, as long as 
time costs are a little over half of total commuting costs. Therefore, these estimates appear 
reasonable in magnitude especially if households over value the monetary costs of commute 
relative to time costs.16     
Further, as expected, the inclusion of commute time as a control completely eliminates 
any relationship between the agglomeration variables and wages, and the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients fall by more than a factor of ten. In summary, the estimated agglomeration 
effects are robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and are also completely 
compensated for by longer commutes, as we would expect if the observed wage differences that 
drive the agglomeration effects are based upon a comparison of intrinsically similar workers in 
terms of productivity. 
 
                                                 
15 In principle, the appropriate way to handle measurement error in PUMA to PUMA commute time is to instrument 
for PUMA to PUMA commute time with workplace PUMA commutes rather than simply including workplace 
commutes directly in the wage model. This IV approach is required to assess the magnitude of the commute time 
effect on wages. However, the IV estimates on PUMA to PUMA commute time are slightly smaller, but very similar 
in magnitude, to the estimates presented and discussed in this paper. 
16 The literature on commute times (Small, 1992) typically finds that time costs of commutes are valued at 
approximately half the wage rate, but those studies estimate this valuation based on comparing time costs to 
monetary costs of commute. An equally reasonable, alternative explanation for these results is that individuals over 
value the monetary costs of commuting relative to time costs, rather than undervaluing their time spent commuting 
relative to the value of their time at work. Also see Brownstone and Small (2005) for more recent evidence that finds 
commuting time cost values of up to 90% of the wage rate.  
Improving the Residential Location Controls 
 The residential location controls used in this paper are clearly limited by the location 
information available in the PUMS’s. Specifically, residential location is only provided down to 
a geographic area containing 100,000 or more residents. As we focus on larger, more dense 
metropolitan statistical areas, however, these areas will be divided into more residential 
PUMA’s, which presumably allows for more across residential PUMA sorting.17 Specifically, we 
examine three subsamples where 1999 metropolitan population must exceed two, three, and five 
million, respectively. The results are shown in Table 4, and the estimated effect of agglomeration 
is unchanged for these subsamples. The coefficient estimates on the human capital variables 
again exhibit an attenuation of approximately 10 percent across all samples from the inclusion 
the residential location fixed effects. 
 In addition, Ortalo-Mange and Rady (2006) find substantial heterogeneity among 
homeowners within neighborhood, but considerable homogeneity among renters and among 
homeowners who moved into the neighborhood at similar times. Presumably, renters and recent 
homeowners chose this neighborhood based on current prices and neighborhood amenities and 
therefore are very similar, while homeowners that moved to the neighborhood in earlier years 
chose this neighborhood based on different price and amenity levels. In order to address this 
concern, we develop residential location fixed effects by tenure in residence where a full set of 
PUMA fixed effects are created for each of the following categories: renters, owners who have 
been residing in the neighborhood for less than one year, owners who have been residing in the 
neighborhood between one and five years, and owners who have been residing in the 
neighborhood for more than five years. The results are shown in Table 5, and the expansion of 
                                                 
17 Rosenthal and Strange (2006) use a similar strategy in their paper focusing on dense employment areas where 
employment is spread over more workplace PUMA’s. 
the residential fixed effects has little impact on the estimated agglomeration effect. Further, these 
controls significantly improve the model fit, and the attenuation of the coefficient estimates on 
the human capital variables increases from 10 to approximately 15 percent. 
Alternative Subsamples and Robust Commute Time Estimates 
 As discussed earlier, a key concern is that commute time may be correlated with 
unobservable productivity variables that exist and generate a spurious relationship between 
agglomeration variables and wages. In that case, commute time may act as a proxy for those 
unobservables, and the commute time model may be capturing the true relationship between 
wages and employment concentration. If commute time acts as a proxy for these unobservables, 
we would not expect a robust relationship between commute time and wages across regions, 
population subgroups or mode choice. Rather, the estimated coefficient on commute in a wage 
equation would likely vary across subsamples based on the urban environment and options faced 
by the individuals in those subsamples. On the other hand, if commute time captures a more 
fundamental relationship in urban economies, such as the existence of a locational equilibrium, 
the estimated coefficient on commute time should be fairly stable across these samples.   
 Table 6 presents estimates for a series of regional subsamples for the total employment 
specification. The first column presents results for the full sample with the subsequent columns 
containing the estimates for metropolitan areas in the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West 
regions. The commuted time results are quite stable across the samples with estimates ranging 
from 0.0075 to 0.0099 over the four regions as compared to 0.0089 for the full sample. Similarly, 
estimates from the density model, which are not presented in a table, range from 0.0085 to 
0.0119 over the four regions as compared to 0.0093 for the full sample. These findings suggest 
that commute time is capturing a relationship between wages and commutes that is fairly stable 
across different regions of the country, even though residential and commuting patterns vary 
dramatically across those regions. 
 The qualitative findings concerning the coefficient estimate on total employment in Table 
3 are replicated across all four regions. The estimated impact of agglomeration increases 
moderately after controlling for residential fixed effects and then falls to near zero after the 
inclusion of a control for commute time. The raw coefficient estimates on total employment 
exhibit substantial variation across regions, but in part this is due to different urban environments 
in each region. After standardizing the coefficients using the within metropolitan area standard 
deviation of total employment, the estimated agglomeration effects in the fixed effect models are 
closer in magnitude with values of 0.0318, 0.0616, 0.0316, 0.0226, and 0.0153 for the full 
sample, Northeast, Midwest, South, and West regions, respectively. In addition, while the raw 
estimates on employment density differ dramatically from the estimates for total employment, 
the standardized estimates for density have a nearly identical pattern across regions with 
estimates of 0.0313, 0.0565, 0.0291, 0.0193, and 0.0123 using the same samples.18     
 Table 7 presents a similar set of estimates for subsamples based on college education, 
transportation mode, and race/ethnicity.  As in Table 6, the estimates on commute time are stable 
across the college educated, non-college educated workers, automobile commuter, mass transit 
commuter, and non-Hispanic white samples with estimates ranging between 0.0083 and 0.0116.  
The only exception to this finding is the minority sample, where the estimated relationship 
between commute time and wages of 0.0058 is substantially smaller than the estimates for any 
                                                 
18 Note that the within metropolitan area standard deviations on total employment for the full sample, Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West are 3.931, 3.993, 1.729, 2.160, and 6.311, and the standard deviations on employment 
density for the same samples are 3.484, 6.945, 0.394, 0.571, and 0.603. These lead to raw estimates that vary wildly. 
For example, in the total employment estimates, the raw estimates for the Northeast, Midwest, and South regions are 
dramatically larger than in the West, while in the employment density models the raw estimates for the Midwest and 
to some extent the South and West regions are much larger than the estimates for the Northeast. 
other samples considered. This finding should not be surprising considering previous research 
concerning minority commutes and the spatial mismatch hypothesis. For example, Gabriel and 
Rosenthal (1996) and Petitte and Ross (1999) both find racial differences in commutes that 
cannot be compensated for by differences in housing prices and/or wages.  Our findings are 
consistent with the notion that minorities are in a locational equilibrium when compared to each 
other, but are undercompensated for their commutes when compared to the majority population.  
 The estimates of total employment are again consistent with the general results from 
Table 3.  For all subsamples, the inclusion of residential location fixed effects leads to moderate 
increases in the estimated effect of agglomeration economies, and any estimated effect of 
agglomeration economies disappears when controls for commute time are included. The 
estimates for every subgroup are consistent with the existence of agglomeration economies that 
are underestimated in simple OLS estimation because low skill individuals tend to reside in 
central cities near employment concentrations, and there is no evidence of bias from omitted 
ability variables in the fixed effect estimates because all wage differentials are entirely 
compensated by differences in commuting time between employment locations. The estimated 
agglomeration effects in the residential location fixed effect models are very similar between the 
education level subsamples. On the other hand, the estimated agglomeration effects for the mass 
transit sample is much larger than for the automobile sample, which is likely due to the high 
concentration of mass transit users in the Northeast where agglomeration effects are largest.19   
Extended Model Specifications 
Table 8 estimates models that also include controls for the workplace PUMA share of 
workers with a college education, share of workers in the worker’s own occupation, and share of 
                                                 
19 Northeast residents comprise more than half of the mass-transit subsample. The authors recognize that 
transportation mode choice is clearly endogenous to labor market earnings, and these models are estimated primarily 
to examine the stability of commute time coefficients across subsamples. 
workers in the worker’s own industry. The extended model is still consistent with agglomeration 
economies associated with total employment or employment density. The education level of 
workers in the PUMA is also positively associated with wages, which is consistent with the 
standard human capital externalities explanation that often arises in this context (Rauch, 1993; 
Moretti, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 2006). Wages also increase with the share of workers in a 
worker’s own occupation and industry suggesting the existence of localization economies 
(Wheaton and Lewis, 2002; Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon, 2004; Fu, 2007).  
As before, the inclusion of residential PUMA fixed effects increases the relative 
magnitude of the estimated agglomeration coefficients, and the findings are consistent with low 
productivity individuals sorting into locations with concentrated employment, possibly due to the 
centrality of their residential locations.  On the other hand, the estimated effects of share college 
educated and share in own occupation decline. These findings are consistent with the notion that 
high skill individuals sort into places with concentrations of highly educated workers, as well as 
places with concentrations of workers in similar occupations. Occupation provides a very good 
indication of the skills possessed by a worker (Bacolod and Blum, 2005; Bacolod, Blum, and 
Strange, 2007), and the occupation result may arise from sorting based on skills where more 
highly skilled individuals sort into locations with workers of similar skills.20   
The inclusion of commute time as a regressor again leads to very large reductions in the 
magnitude of and statistical insignificance of the overall agglomeration effect and the 
agglomeration effect associated college educated workers. These results provide strong evidence 
in favor of the existence of agglomeration economies associated with both the overall 
concentration of employment and human capital externalities. The inclusion of commute time, 
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that Bacolod, Blum, and Strange (2007) find evidence of agglomeration economies based on the 
concentration of skilled workers using occupation to characterize the skill levels of workers.  
 
however, does not erode the magnitude of the estimates on the localization economy variables 
over industry and occupation. While the commute time results do not further strengthen our 
confidence in the results for the localization economy variables, these findings should not be 
viewed as a rejection of the findings concerning localization economies. Unlike the employment 
concentration and education variables, the localization economy variables represent factors that 
vary across workers for the same workplace location. It seems unlikely that commute time could 
both penalize a worker in industry A with a long commute because a large concentration of 
employment in that worker’s industry leads to high wages, and also compensate a worker in 
industry B because of low wages associated with little employment in that worker’s industry. 
Table 8 repeats the extended analysis for subsamples based on whether the worker 
obtained a four-year college degree. The qualitative results are quite similar for both samples.  
The estimated effects of the agglomeration variable are somewhat larger for the college educated 
sample, while the effect for share educated appears to be somewhat smaller for the college 
educated sample. Accordingly, this paper contributes to, but does not explicitly resolve, the 
question of whether agglomeration economies are larger for educated workers (Wheeler, 2001) 
or for workers with less education (Adamson, Clark, and Partridge, 2004). The results in Table 6 
suggest that economies might be somewhat larger for college educated workers, but the results in 
Table 8 unpack this overall result suggesting that while the agglomeration effects of employment 
concentration might be larger for college educated workers human capital externalities appear to 
be smaller for those workers. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper estimates standard agglomeration models using a sample of 33 metropolitan 
and consolidated metropolitan statistical areas from the Public Use Microdata Sample of the 
2000 Decennial Census. The estimates for both total employment and employment density are 
consistent with a positive relationship between employment based measures of agglomeration 
and wages. The inclusion of residential location controls intended to absorb worker 
heterogeneity actually leads to an increase in the estimated effects of agglomeration.  These 
findings suggest that lower productivity workers sort into concentrations of employment possibly 
due to their more central residential location.  Estimates for the individual education variables 
attentuate when the residential controls are included, which is consistent with the residential 
controls capturing unobserved heterogeneity. The location controls are refined by focusing on 
samples of larger metropolitan areas where the location controls should provide more 
information and by including location controls that also contain information on time residing in 
the neighborhood. In all cases, the evidence of agglomeration effects persisted across samples 
and model specifications.  
The inclusion of commute time dramatically reduces the overall agglomeration effect. 
This finding suggests that these wage differences cannot represent differences in ability across 
workers because the wage differences are explained by commuting costs presumably leaving 
similar workers with similar levels of well being. Further, we examine how the coefficient on 
commute time varies across different subgroups associated with region, education level, minority 
status, and transportation mode.  Presumably, the spatial pattern of residential and workplace 
locations varies dramatically across these subgroups and should lead to different correlations 
between commutes and unobserved productivity attributes, and yet with the exception of 
minority status the coefficients on commutes and the qualitative results of the tests for 
agglomeration economies are very stable across these subgroups. Commute time appears to be 
capturing a more fundamental relationship in urban economies, such as the existence of a 
locational equilibrium. 
Finally, an extended specification is estimated that includes additional variables capturing 
human capital externalities and localization economies based on industry and occupation.  As in 
the previous literature, we find that wages increase with the concentration of college-educated 
workers, as well as with the concentration of workers in a worker’s own industry and occupation.  
These results persist when residential location fixed effects are included with the effect of overall 
employment increasing in magnitude as in previous models. On the other hand, the effect of 
human capital externalities and localization economies by occupation fall with the inclusion of 
fixed effects, possibly because high productivity individuals are sorting across work locations 
based on skill levels. Finally, the inclusion of commute time completely eliminates any estimated 
relationship between wages and either employment concentration and share college educated 
workers variable, further supporting our view that these effects cannot be the result of 
unobserved productivity attributes. The estimated effects of share of workers in a workers own 
industry or occupation do not disappear once commute time has been included, but this result is 
not entirely surprising since commutes are unlikely to be able to compensate for workplace 
attributes that vary across individuals. 
The results in this paper also have more general implications concerning the nature of 
urban economies. No previous evidence has been found to support that idea that urban labor 
markets are in a locational equilibrium, where differences in wages across locations are 
completely compensated for by differences in commute times. Further, if agglomeration 
economies eventually plateau and possibly decline on the margin at very high concentrations of 
employment, empirical estimates of agglomeration effects may understate the total importance of 
agglomeration in urban economies, especially in cities with relatively low levels of traffic 
congestion, because in equilibrium workers should continue to crowd into the high employment 
concentration locations until marginal productivity declines sufficiently to assure equal wages 
net of commuting costs. 
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Table1:  Variable Names, Means, and Standard Deviations 
Variable Name Non-College College Graduates 
Dependent Variable 
Wage Rate 20.121 (27.466) 36.602 (54.294) 
Workplace PUMA Controls 
Total PUMA employment in 100,000’s 3.902 (5.255) 4.200 (5.116) 
PUMA Employment density in 1000’s/square mile 0.984 (3.506) 1.568 (4.673) 
Share of college educated workers in PUMA 0.353 (0.082) 0.387 (0.087) 
Share in own occupation in PUMA 0.094 (0.054) 0.110 (0.074) 
Share in own industry in PUMA 0.109 (0.080) 0.128 (0.080) 
Average commute time in PUMA in minutes   
Metropolitan Area Controls 
Percent college educated in MSA and occuption 0.024 (0.033) 0.053 (0.043) 
Percent college educated in MSA and industry 0.031 (0.027) 0.048 (0.033) 
Individual Worker Controls 
Age of worker  42.528 (7.964) 43.061 (8.076) 
Non-Hispanic white worker 0.746 (0.435) 0.830 (0.376) 
African-American worker 0.125 (0.330) 0.061 (0.240) 
Hispanic worker 0.078 (0.268) 0.011 (0.106) 
Asian and Pacific Islander worker 0.044 (0.205) 0.094 (0.292) 
High school degree 0.705 (0.456) 0.000 (0.000) 
Associates degree 0.114 (0.318) 0.000 (0.000) 
Four year college degree 0.000 (0.000) 0.600 (0.490) 
Master degree 0.000 (0.000) 0.256 (0.436) 
Degree beyond Masters 0.000 (0.000) 0.144 (0.351) 
Worker single 0.278 (0.448) 0.227 (0.419) 
Number of children in household 0.547 (0.498) 0.558 (0.497) 
Born in the United States 0.795 (0.403) 0.816 (0.387) 
Years in residence if not born in U.S. 3.376 (7.257) 2.777 (6.687) 
Quality of spoken English 0.158 (0.364) 0.174 (0.379) 
 
Sample Size 519,530 311,516 
 
Table 2:  Baseline Model of Agglomeration Economies for Logarithm of the Wage Rate 
Independent Variables Total Employment Density 
Total employment in 100,000’s 0.0049 (2.95)  
Employment density in 1000’s per square mile  0.0062 (11.28) 
Percent college educated in MSA and occuption 0.9186 (3.37) 0.9173 (3.32) 
Percent college educated in MSA and industry 1.7158 (6.38) 1.6726 (6.47) 
Age of worker  0.0387 (33.89) 0.0387 (33.87) 
Age of worker squared divided by 100 -0.0004 (25.83) -0.0004 (25.82) 
Non-Hispanic white worker 0.1512 (11.90) 0.1523 (11.65) 
African-American worker 0.0184 (1.50) 0.0206 (1.63) 
Hispanic worker -0.0102 (0.94) -0.0084 (0.76) 
Asian and Pacific Islander worker 0.0582 (5.91) 0.0591 (5.91) 
High school degree 0.2064 (26.03) 0.2061 (26.09) 
Associates degree 0.2705 (29.49) 0.2703 (29.81) 
Four year college degree 0.4549 (43.58) 0.4547 (44.49) 
Master degree 0.5774 (49.41) 0.5771 (50.65) 
Degree beyond Masters 0.7030 (69.81) 0.7027 (71.47) 
Worker single -0.1307 (56.22) -0.1306 (56.07) 
Number of children in household 0.0714 (33.97) 0.0716 (33.46) 
Born in the United States 0.2782 (12.94) 0.2764 (12.74) 
Years in residence if not born in U.S. 0.0080 (13.43) 0.0079 (13.38) 
Quality of spoken English -0.0224 (3.49) -0.0222 (3.45) 
R-square 0.2883 0.2885 
 
Note:  The dependent variable for all regressions is the logarithm of the estimated hourly wages, 
which is calculated as annual labor market earnings divided by the product of number of weeks 
worked and average hours worked per week.  The key variable of interest is either the total 
number of full time workers in a workplace PUMA or the density of full time workers in a 
PUMA where full time work is defined as worked an average of at least 35 hours per week.  The 
sample of 831,046 observations contains male full time workers aged 30 to 59 in the selected 
metropolitan areas.  The models include metropolitan, one digit industry, and one digit 
occupation fixed effects, but those estimates are suppressed.
 
Table 3:  Agglomeration Wage Models without and with Location Controls 
Total Employment Density Variables 
Baseline Fixed Effects Commute Time Baseline Fixed Effects Commute Time 
Employment 0.0049 (2.95) 0.0081 (3.99) 0.0007 (0.92)    
Density    0.0062 (11.28) 0.0090 (18.43) -0.0002 (0.41) 
Commute Time   0.0089 (18.41)   0.0093 (22.24) 
MSA-Occ. College 0.9186 (3.37) 0.8983 (3.26) 0.8342 (2.91) 0.9173 (3.32) 0.8866 (3.19) 0.8315 (2.90) 
MSA-Ind. College 1.7158 (6.38) 1.4861 (5.94) 1.3678 (5.56) 1.6726 (6.47) 1.4446 (6.00) 1.3677 (5.56) 
R-Square 0.2883 0.3029 0.3045 0.2885 0.3031 0.3045 
Note:  The baseline columns contain the results from table 2, the fixed effect columns contain the results from a model where 
metropolitan fixed effects are replaced by residential Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) fixed effects, and the commute time 
columns contain the results for the residential PUMA fixed effect model after the inclusion of the average commute time for the 
individual’s workplace PUMA. 
 
Table 4:  Agglomeration Wage Models with Location Controls for Subsamples of Larger Metropolitan Areas 
Sample Full Sample MSA Pop > 2 Mill. MSA Pop > 3 Mill. MSA Pop > 5 Mill. 
Employment Total Models 
Employment 0.0081 (3.99) 0.0079 (3.90) 0.0076 (3.80) 0.0073 (3.31) 
R-Square 0.3029 0.3052 0.3085 0.3087 
Sample Size 831,046 699,266 602,240 484,285 
Employment Density Models 
Density 0.0090 (18.43) 0.0088 (18.82) 0.0087 (19.18) 0.0087 (19.49) 
R-Square 0.3031 0.3055 0.3089 0.3094 
Sample Size 831,046 699,266 602,240 484,285 
Note:  The full sample column contains the results from table 2.  The other columns present results from smaller samples based on 
dropping all metropolitan areas with 1999 populations below a threshold. 
 
 
Table 5:  Agglomeration Wage Models with Location Controls based on Tenure and Time of Residence 
Total Employment Density Variables 
Fixed Effects Tenure based Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Tenure based Fixed 
Effects 
Employment 0.0081 (3.99) 0.0075 (3.84)   
Density   0.0090 (18.43) 0.0086 (18.86) 
R-Square 0.3029 0.3175 0.3031 0.3177 
Note:  The fixed effect column contains the results presented in table 3, and the tenure based fixed effects column contains the 
estimates from a model that includes a unique fixed effect for each of four tenure categories in each residential PUMA.  The four 
categories are renter, owner in residence less than one year, owner is residence between one and five years, and owner in residence 
more than five years. 
 
Table 6:  Agglomeration Wage Models by Region for Total Employment 
Region Full Sample Northeast Midwest South West 
Baseline Model 
Employment – Raw 0.0049 (2.95) 0.0095 (15.89) 0.0091 (3.91) 0.0120 (4.74) 0.0015 (1.77) 
Employment – Stnd 0.0191 0.0376 0.0197 0.0208 0.0093 
R-Square 0.2883 0.2848 0.2628 0.3095 0.2987 
Fixed Effect 
Employment – Raw 0.0081 (3.99) 0.0156 (26.48) 0.0146 (5.37) 0.0131 (7.30) 0.00242 (2.56) 
Employment – Stnd 0.0318 0.0616 0.0316 0.0226 0.0153 
R-Square 0.3029 0.3023 0.2767 0.3198 0.3148 
Commute Time 
Employment – Raw 0.0007 (0.92) -0.0005 (0.034) -0.0019 (0.82) 0.0029 (2.08) 0.0007 (0.76) 
Employment – Stnd 0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0041 0.0050 0.0044 
Commute Time 0.0089 (18.41) 0.0090 (10.89) 0.0099 (10.05) 0.0087 (10.66) 0.0075 (6.41) 
R-Square 0.3045 0.3033 0.2777 0.3204 0.3153 
 
Sample Size 831,046 211,991 198,309 221,043 199,703 
Note:  The top panel presents the results for all subsamples using the total employment specification, the second panel presents the 
results including residential location fixed effects, and the third panel presents the results including both residential location fixed 
effects and commute time.  Standardized coefficients are based on the within metropolitan area standard deviation of the total 
employment variable measured at the workplace PUMA.  The standard deviations are 3.931, 3.993, 1.729, 2.160, and 6.311 for the 
full sample, northeast, midwest, south, and west, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7:  Agglomeration Wage Models by Subsample for Total Employment 
Subsample No Four Year 
Degree  
Four Year 
Degree 
Automobile Mass Transit Non-Hispanic 
White 
Minority 
Baseline Model 
Employment–Raw 0.0029 (2.33) 0.0083 (3.99) 0.0048 (3.11) 0.0113 (7.16) 0.0096 (4.68) -0.0001 (0.09) 
Employment–Stnd 0.0115 0.0319 0.0179 0.0503 0.0333 -0.0005 
R-Square 0.2110 0.1723 0.2808 0.4091 0.2476 0.2857 
Fixed Effects 
Employment–Raw 0.0072 (4.19) 0.0092 (3.92) 0.0068 (4.31) 0.0128 (10.46) 0.0108 (4.62) 0.0041 (2.94) 
Employment–Stnd 0.0285 0.0354 0.0253 0.0569 0.0374 0.0201 
R-Square 0.2257 0.1954 0.2944 0.4370 0.2623 0.3018 
Commute Time 
Employment–Raw 0.0002 (0.20) 0.0012 (1.73) 0.0008 (1.13) -0.0026 (1.18) 0.0011 (1.67) 0.0004 (0.40) 
Employment–Stnd 0.0008 0.0046 0.0030 -0.0116 0.0038 0.0020 
Commute Time 0.0094 (17.42) 0.0083 (16.02) 0.0092 (18.41) 0.0116 (7.86) 0.0098 (21.61) 0.0058 (8.12) 
R-Square 0.2278 0.1967 0.2959 0.4382 0.2642 0.3025 
 
Sample Size 519,530 311,516 730,631 58,563 600,226 230,820 
Note:  The top panel presents the results for all subsamples using the total employment specification, the second panel presents the 
results including residential location fixed effects, and the third panel presents the results including both residential location fixed 
effects and commute time. The within metropolitan area standard deviations for the no four year degree, four year degree, automobile 
using, mass transit using, non-Hispanic white, and minority subsamples are 3.843, 3.961, 3.712, 4.473, 3.464 and 4.894, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Extended Agglomeration Wage Models without and with Location Controls 
Total Employment Density Variables 
Baseline Fixed Effects Commute Time Baseline Fixed Effects Commute Time 
Employment 0.0019 (2.31) 0.0061 (4.17) 0.0012 (1.59)    
Density    0.0024 (7.47) 0.0063 (13.77) -0.0004 (0.99) 
Share College 0.4953 (14.69) 0.3349 (9.70) 0.0479 (1.46) 0.4881 (14.90) 0.3099 (8.69) 0.0457 (1.41) 
Share in Occ. 0.5959 (9.42) 0.5203 (8.46) 0.5036 (7.80) 0.5820 (9.16) 0.4991 (7.87) 0.5009 (7.76) 
Share in Ind. 0.2741 (3.61) 0.2778 (3.97) 0.2569 (3.82) 0.2635 (3.54) 0.2511 (3.76) 0.2540 (3.78) 
Commute Time   0.0082 (15.50)   0.0091 (17.29) 
R-Square 0.2909 0.3042  0.3051 0.2910 0.3042 0.3051 
Note:  The table presents results for the specifications in table 3 after including variables for the share of workers in the workplace 
PUMA who have a four year college degree, who work in the same one digit Occupation as the worker, and who work in the same one 
digit industry as the worker.
 
Table 9:  Extended Agglomeration Wage Models without and with Location Controls by Education Level 
Total Employment Density Variables 
Baseline Fixed Effects Commute Time Baseline Fixed Effects Commute Time 
No Four Year College Degree 
Employment 0.0001 (0.20) 0.0047 (4.19) 0.0005 (0.50)    
Density    0.0012 (3.68) 0.0050 (10.01) -0.0017 (3.31) 
Share College 0.4754 (15.38) 0.4076 (11.08) 0.1047 (3.17) 0.4568 (15.73) 0.4000 (11.92) 0.1046 (3.33) 
Share in Occ. 0.4554 (6.72) 0.4399 (6.84) 0.4087 (6.29) 0.4504 (6.61) 0.4374 (6.71) 0.4070 (6.28) 
Share in Ind. 0.2854 (5.27) 0.2667 (5.28) 0.2551 (5.30) 0.2842 (5.33) 0.2451 (5.07) 0.2572 (5.27) 
Commute Time   0.0086 (15.36)   0.0097 (16.53) 
R-Square 0.2137 0.2273 0.2285 0.2137 0.2273 0.2286 
Four Year College Degree or More 
Employment 0.0048 (4.54) 0.0074 (4.16) 0.0019 (2.90)    
Density    0.0037 (8.31) 0.0076 (18.54) 0.0015 (2.74) 
Share College 0.5617 (10.83) 0.2642 (6.72) 0.0006 (0.01) 0.5776 (10.60) 0.2109 (4.88) -0.0021 (0.05) 
Share in Occ. 0.5580 (5.33) 0.4033 (4.20) 0.4259 (4.46) 0.5083 (4.98) 0.3626 (3.79) 0.4147 (4.34) 
Share in Ind. 0.2824 (2.69) 0.3350 (3.46) 0.3051 (3.25) 0.2590 (2.48) 0.3060 (3.25) 0.2982 (3.18) 
Commute Time   0.0075 (12.57)    
R-Square 0.1759 0.1965 0.1973 0.1757 0.1967 0.1973 
Note:  The top panel presents the results for the same specifications that were presented in table 7 for the non-college educated 
sample, and the bottom panel presents the results for the four year college degree sample. 
 
